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In one horrifying night and through the long misery of nearly eighteen years of
injustice that have followed it, the city of Bhopal in India can be said to have
experienced the head-on impact of world historical and political economic
processes. In 1969, Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) set up a plant to man-
ufacture the pesticide Sevin in Bhopal, with the permission and, indeed, the en-
couragement of the Indian government. This was the heyday of the Green Rev-
olution, introduced in India in the mid-1960s and based on HYV (high-yielding
variety) seeds, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and vastly increased irrigation.
The disastrous social and environmental consequences of this technological
choice (made by Indian planners,1 with backing from international agencies
such as the World Bank and the Ford and Rockefeller foundations) are well
documented,2 but it is not always remembered that the Bhopal gas tragedy has
its roots in the same narrative. The design of the Bhopal plant, as well as the
policies relating to its maintenance and operation, were in keeping with the
double-standard often applied by transnational corporations in their Third
World outposts, where environmental, worker, and community safety issues
may be seen as less pressing than at home.3 Finally, for nearly two decades af-
ter the deadly gas leak, the legal struggle to make the Union Carbide Corpora-
tion (the parent corporation of UCIL) accountable for the tragedy has played
out against the changing backdrop of the demise of the Soviet bloc and the in-
troduction of economic liberalization in India. Even though the new economic
reforms were formally put in place in India only in July 1991, the writing on the
wall had been quite clear in the years preceding. The Indian State’s unwilling-
ness to discourage foreign private investment has been a crucial factor in the
continuing injustice in Bhopal.
To begin at the grim beginning, the lethal gases that leaked from the Union
Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal in the dark early hours of December 3, 1984
killed several thousand people and injured more than half a million.4 This acci-
dent—the world’s worst industrial disaster—was caused by a runaway reaction
in a gigantic storage tank in which forty-two tons of methyl isocyanate (MIC)
were stored. The concrete storage tank burst open and a huge poison cloud of
MIC and other breakdown chemicals drifted across the city of Bhopal, destroy-
ing every form of life it encountered. Although the exact death toll will never be
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known, it is now officially admitted to be more than 5,000, while activists esti-
mate that the figure may be closer to 20,000.5 Those who survived that night suf-
fered severe damage to their lungs and eyes, as well as to their gastrointestinal,
reproductive, immune, neural, and other systems.6
In keeping with the social geography characteristic of communities living
with chemical industries, the Union Carbide facility was surrounded by some of
the poorest neighborhoods in Bhopal. Jaiprakash Nagar, Chola Kenchi, Kazi
Camp, Arif Nagar and others were among the worst-affected areas; their resi-
dents were mainly daily wage workers whose ability to perform hard manual la-
bor has been impaired by gas-related injuries and chronic illnesses. According
to a 1998 report:
Over 70% of the exposed population has been in the unorganized sector, with peo-
ple earning subsistence wages through day labor or petty trade. A large number
of men and women who pushed hand carts, carried loads, dug soil, repaired cars
and did other jobs can no longer pursue their trades after being exposed to Car-
bide’s gases . . . the loss of regular income has driven tens of thousands of families
to chronic starvation conditions. Loss of income also makes people borrow mon-
ey from local money lenders who charge up to 200% interest so that chances of
paying back are low and debts keep growing.7
Yet activist victims in Bhopal have persevered in their struggle for justice for
nearly two decades, holding together in such organizations as Bhopal Gas Peed-
it Mahila Udyog Sangathan (Bhopal Gas-Affected Women Workers’ Union)
and Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila Stationery Karamchari Sangh (Bhopal Gas-
Affected Women Stationery Workers’ Organization).
Union Carbide’s immediate response was to withold important informa-
tion about the harmful effects of MIC, the main chemical in the poison cloud.
Plant officials at the time of the leak stated that MIC was no worse than a “po-
tent tear gas.” Union Carbide’s doctors denied the possibility of cyanide poi-
soning (which caused many deaths that might have been averted if sodium thio-
sulphate—a cyanide antidote—had been administered), and, later, statements
were made by their American medical experts, Drs. Peter Halberg and Hans
Weill, that MIC has no long-term medical effects. Union Carbide was quick to
shift the blame to those it had killed and maimed in the desperately poor com-
munities near the Bhopal plant; their very poverty and helplessness were turned
into accusations against them. Bud Holman, attorney for Union Carbide, de-
scribed the Bhopal victims in these terms: “Some have tuberculosis, which is
endemic in that area, some have emphysema, which is endemic in that area,
some have malnutrition, which is a troublesome thing in that area. Each indi-
vidual history has to be examined in order to determine what damage he has,
or whether he has a claim or not. The claims include a considerable number of
fraudulent claims, we expect.”8
Again, Union Carbide’s medical expert, Dr. Peter Halberg, told a reporter,
“The MIC produced a heavy cloud which settled very close to the earth, killing
70 ILWCH, 62, Fall 2002
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children because of their immature lungs, the elderly because of their diminished
lung capacity, those who ran because their lungs expanded too quickly, and small
animals. The survivors included those people who stood still and covered their
faces with handkerchiefs. . . .”9 In other words, it was their own fault for being
too young, too old, or too medically untrained to know that their best bet was
to stand still as the deadly cloud engulfed their city. It has been pointed out that
the corporation was well aware of the dangerous nature of MIC. To cite only one
example, the results of Carbide-sponsored research undertaken at the Mellon
Institute in 1963 (one of the many studies commissioned by the corporation over
the years) included the statement that “methyl isocyanate appears to be the most
toxic member of the isocyanate family . . . [It] is highly toxic by both the pectoral
and skin penetration routes and presents a definite hazard to life by inhala-
tion.”10 By contrast, the findings announced by Carbide scientists in the years
after the disaster tended to minimize the degree of long-term damage perpe-
trated by the Carbide gases. Even now, despite repeated requests by victims’
groups, the corporation continues to invoke the Trade Secrets Act to justify their
withholding of medical information and research on MIC.11
In the immediate aftermath of the disaster many medical professionals
came into Bhopal to offer their services, collect crucially important survey in-
formation, monitor the health status of the gas-affected victims, and write criti-
cal affidavits for the case against Carbide. Once their activities in the Bhopal
were brought to a halt by the Indian government, they continued with labora-
tory research and the publication of findings that counter the false sense of se-
curity being fostered by Carbide researchers.12 Ten years after the disaster the
International Medical Commission on Bhopal (IMCB) went to Bhopal to chron-
icle the long-term health consequences of the gas leak. Formed by two eminent
epidemiologists at the invitation of victim groups, the International Medical
Commission on Bhopal was an independent inquiry commission consisting of
fifteen medical professionals from twelve countries. Their final report, released
in New York in December 1996, showed that as many as 50,000 survivors may
be permanently disabled, either partially or totally. While reaffirming the previ-
ously known facts about the severe damage caused by the Union Carbide gases
to the lungs and eyes of the victims, the Commission also reported widespread
neurotoxicological damage. One major concern for the Commissioners was the
health status of children: since nobody under the age of eighteen had been reg-
istered as a gas victim, there had been no official recognition of their illness and,
of course, no compensation. The Commission strongly recommended the regis-
tration, compensation and ongoing monitoring of those survivors who were in
utero or under age eighteen at the time of the disaster and of the children of sur-
vivors. They found medical care and treatment of chronically ill Bhopal sur-
vivors to be lacking in continuity; their medical conditions were seldom treated
as gas exposure-related. One of the major recommendations of the Medical
Commission was the establishment of a network of community-based health
centers to serve the chronic health care needs of the victims.13 Although there
has been no official response to this recommendation, a voluntary initiative
Bhopal: Continuing Aftermath of the World’s Worst Industrial Disaster 71
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known as the Sambhavna Trust set up the Bhopal People’s Health and Docu-
mentation Clinic in 1996. The Sambhavna Clinic provides free medical care to
Bhopal survivors through modern medicine as well as traditional Indian thera-
pies and also carries out health survey and education in the affected communi-
ties, monitors continuing exposure related deaths, conducts research, runs a doc-
umentation unit, organizes health camps, and so on. Their efforts reach a small
fraction of the survivors who are in need of appropriate medical attention and
underscore the indifference to the survivors’ circumstances shown by the Union
Carbide Corporation and by the Indian government.
There is a good deal of evidence to show that the Union Carbide Corpora-
tion had been negligent in the design, maintenance, and operation of the Bhopal
plant. The most egregious design blunder was the US management’s decision to
store MIC in Bhopal in 15,000 gallon tanks rather than in smaller individual con-
tainers, a decision which specifically overrode the objections of Carbide’s man-
agers in India.14 The company chose the more dangerous option because they
were intending to manufacture MIC not only for the plant’s own use but also for
sales to other industrial customers. A cost-cutting drive initiated at the corpo-
rate headquarters in Danbury, Connecticut, in 1980 had reduced the size of work
and maintenance crews at the Bhopal plant’s MIC unit, and the refrigeration unit
that might have kept the MIC at safe storage temperatures had been shut off to
save on expenses.15 The runaway reaction occurred when water used for wash-
ing the lines accidentally leaked into the tank containing MIC at ambient tem-
perature. Although their designed capacities may have been inadequate for such
a reaction, none of the MIC unit’s safety systems were working:16 the scrubber
which was supposed to neutralize escaping gases with caustic soda was empty,
and the flare tower designed to burn off gases from the scrubber was under re-
pair. The alarm system had been turned off because it had been going off very
frequently in response to numerous smaller leaks in the preceding months. Since
the night of the disaster, the corporation has directed its considerable resources
toward lawyers and public relations experts in an effort to escape legal liability
and bury the memory of Bhopal.
As news of the disaster reached other parts of the world, droves of Ameri-
can claims lawyers descended on the city, promising victims untold riches from
personal injury lawsuits against Union Carbide. In order to protect the victims
from unscrupulous lawyers the Government of India passed the Bhopal Gas
Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act in March 1985, which stipulated that
the government would, in its parens patriae role, pursue justice for and provide
assistance to the victims of the disaster. The reasoning behind this was that the
government was in a better position than the impoverished and illiterate typical
victim to arrange for adequate legal representation and to pursue a powerful
multinational corporation through the byways of justice. The pursuit was vigor-
ous in the beginning: in a New York District Court in 1985, the Indian govern-
ment successfully countered Carbide’s efforts to shift the blame entirely on Union
Carbide India Limited (UCIL), its Indian subsidiary, which with its far smaller
assets could not have been expected to pay any substantial amount of compen-
72 ILWCH, 62, Fall 2002
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sation to the victims. The Indian government was interested in engaging in a
struggle for compensation with the Union Carbide Corporation, not its much
smaller subsidiary, and would have also preferred to pursue the case in a US
court, where the laws and standards of compensation for toxic exposure cases and
procedures for class action litigation with many victims were more fully devel-
oped than they were in India. So the federal District Court in New York was treat-
ed to the piquant spectacle of the Indian government arguing in an American
court that the Indian legal system was shoddy and inadequate, while Carbide’s
lawyers expressed their highest admiration for the standards of law and justice in
India. Judge John Keenan ruled that the issue concerned Union Carbide Corpo-
ration, not just UCIL, but that it could be decided in the Indian courts.
Union Carbide’s legal strategy has been fairly simple: to outlast its victims
by delaying the litigation process and to keep the case from going to trial. Once
the case was transferred to India, the corporation would keep challenging the
jurisdiction of the Indian courts by alleging that its due process rights were be-
ing violated. This tactic was designed to threaten the Indian government with
many a time-consuming legal journey back through the US courts. Also, in ear-
ly 1985, Carbide’s lawyers began to bat around the proposition that the gas leak
was a deliberate act of sabotage by a disgruntled employee. While this sabotage
theory has paid off richly in public relations terms and still remains the first
“fact” that the company states about the Bhopal gas tragedy, Carbide has been
very anxious to keep it out of the courtroom, partly because of its inherent false-
hood17 and partly because an act of sabotage by an employee is no defense
against liability under Indian law.
The litigation began in the District Court of Bhopal in 1986, which ordered
Carbide to pay substantial interim relief—$270 million—to the devastated vic-
tims of the disaster. Predictably, the corporation appealed the court’s ruling and
took the matter to the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The High Court reduced
the amount of interim payment somewhat, and in keeping with its stalling tac-
tics, Carbide once again appealed the ruling. The matter of interim relief was
then taken to the Supreme Court, which suddenly and surprisingly ruled in Feb-
ruary 1989 that the Indian government and Union Carbide should agree to a set-
tlement which required the corporation to pay a mere $470 million in total dam-
ages. This amount was insufficient even to pay for the basic medical treatment
that Bhopal victims required on account of gas exposure and is pitifully small
compared to the damages paid to the victims of other major industrial disasters.
The comparison with Exxon is particularly stark: for the Valdez spill, where no
human lives were lost, a US court found Exxon liable for $5 billion in damages,
while the over 600,000 claimants in the Bhopal case were being asked to share
in the sum of $470 million. It was immediately understood that the Union Car-
bide Corporation had got off very lightly for the death and devastation it caused
in Bhopal: Carbide’s stock price rose by two dollars a share in the New York Stock
Exchange on the day that the settlement was announced. All of the amount 
except some $20 million was covered by Carbide’s liability insurance and small
amounts it had set aside each year while the litigation dragged on.18
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We can only speculate as to the reasons behind the abrupt Supreme Court
decision. Corruption is sometimes blamed, as are political pressures. It is possi-
ble that the Supreme Court bench may have felt that the Bhopal victims had
waited long enough. But there is also the specific historical context of an Indian
state which had just then begun to abandon its established economic policy of
import substitution for a neoliberal regime contingent on the country’s ability to
attract foreign capital.
Following the filing of review petitions by victims’ groups the Supreme
Court upheld the settlement in October 1991, but tried to mitigate it somewhat.
The most significant changes were that Carbide no longer had immunity from
criminal charges in the Bhopal case, the right of unborn children to reopen liti-
gation was restored, and the government was asked to provide insurance cover-
age to the victims. Since that time, the Union Carbide Corporation has been ab-
sconding from the criminal charges of culpable homicide and grievous harm
pending against it in the Magistrate’s Court in Bhopal. While accepting the In-
dian Supreme Court’s ruling upholding the settlement, the corporation has cho-
sen to overlook the fact that the same judgement had rendered them subject to
criminal proceedings in India. Although many different political parties have
risen to power in India in these intervening years, it is significant that no Indian
government since that time has pushed for these proceedings to begin or sought
the extradition from the US of Warren Anderson, the CEO of Union Carbide
at the time of the disaster. As I write, there has been a disturbing new develop-
ment: the Indian government is considering diluting substantially the charges
against Anderson. This has provoked protests and hunger strikes from the
Bhopal survivors and their allies, some as far away as Seadrift, Texas.
The disbursement of the $470 million settlement by government agencies
has been a convoluted and corruption-riddled process, at the end of which in-
jured survivors come away with a sum of money that is not even adequate to pay
for the medical costs they have incurred since 1984. There are no funds available
to provide for the economic rehabilitation of the hundreds of thousands of sur-
vivors whose injuries have prevented them from working or to provide com-
pensation for the years of suffering they have endured. People continue to die
from gas exposure-related injury and illness: as many as thirty each month.19
At the end of 1999 a new lawsuit was filed in New York on the behalf of
Bhopal victims charging Union Carbide with “reckless and depraved indiffer-
ence to human life.” Soon after this, in February 2001, the Union Carbide Cor-
poration merged with the Dow Chemical Corporation. It was feared that the
Dow-Carbide merger could make the legal pursuit more complicated: Dow
spokespeople have claimed that they cannot be held liable for an old accident in
a Carbide plant, and Carbide officials insist that the entity legally responsible for
Bhopal no longer exists. Nonetheless, in November 2001 a US federal appeals
court upheld seven of the fifteen complaints filed by the Bhopal plaintiffs, final-
ly opening up a sliver of possibility that a trial might take place in the US. For
the first time, Carbide has been directed by a court of law to furnish evidence re-
garding some of the claims they have made.
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As long ago as their April 1996 annual shareholders’ meeting, William H.
Joyce, the CEO of Union Carbide Corporation, had told one of us that the com-
pany had no intention of doing anything more for the Bhopal victims. It remains
to be seen whether the US judicial system will be any more effective than its In-
dian counterpart in compelling the corporation to rethink this position. In the
meanwhile, the Bhopal disaster stands as a powerful reminder of the impunity
with which global corporations can, through gross negligence, violate funda-
mental human rights in the Third World.
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